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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellants, Krebs Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. and Chrysler 
Corporation, challenge a bankruptcy court's order denying 
their motions to reconsider, alter, or amend its prior 
decisions. Those decisions approved the rejection of a buy- 
sell agreement between debtor Valley Motors, Inc. and 
Krebs and the subsequent assumption and auction sale of 
the underlying franchises. In response to Chrysler's appeal, 
General Motors Acceptance Corporation has filed a motion 
to dismiss for lack of standing. We will grant GMAC's 
motion and also dismiss Krebs's appeal as moot pursuant 





Valley Motors, Inc. operates an automobile dealership in 
the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania area and is a party to three 
sales and service franchise agreements. In one of these, 
Chrysler allows Valley to sell and service Jeep and Eagle 
automobiles. Valley executed a buy-sell agreement to sell 
its interest in the Jeep-Eagle franchise to Krebs for 
$295,000. Half of that amount was paid upon the execution 
of the buy-sell agreement, and the second half was due 
upon the occurrence of two events: Chrysler's approval of 
the transfer as Jeep-Eagle franchisor and the favorable 
resolution of any protests filed under state law by Krebs's 
competitors. Although Chrysler approved the transfer to 
Krebs, several competing auto dealerships protested it. 
When Valley filed its Chapter 11 petition, those protests 
became subject to the automatic stay and remain 
unresolved. 
 
Valley moved to assume the buy-sell agreement with 
Krebs under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, which 
authorizes a trustee to assume or reject executory 
contracts. 11 U.S.C. S 365. The protesting dealerships 
objected to the motion. Valley then amended its motion to 
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further assert that assumption was in the best interest of 
the bankruptcy estate and satisfied the requirements of the 
business judgment rule. Chrysler "conditionally objected" to 
the assumption, alleging that Valley had previously 
defaulted under the Jeep-Eagle franchise, and it should pay 
over two million dollars in lost-volume sales and damages 
to Chrysler's intangible assets and provide adequate 
assurances of Krebs's future performance under the 
franchise. Another auto dealer, Ronald Charapp, also 
objected, because he had made an offer to purchase all of 
Valley's franchises, inventory and lease obligations for 
$425,000. Charapp suggested the bankruptcy court 
conduct a hearing to entertain other offers on the sale of 
Valley's assets. 
 
On the same day as the hearing on the amended motion 
to assume the buy-sell agreement, but before a decision, 
Valley moved to withdraw its amended motion, arguing that 
Charapp's, not Krebs's, offer would be in the best interest 
of the estate. The next day, the bankruptcy court granted 
Valley's motion to withdraw its amended motion. The day 
after that, Valley moved to reject the buy-sell agreement 
pursuant to section 365. Valley then filed a second motion 
to sell all its franchises (including the Jeep-Eagle 
franchise), parts, shop materials, and fixed and 
miscellaneous assets to Charapp for $425,000. The motion 
stated that the sale was conditioned upon Chrysler's and 
the other franchisors' approval. Valley then filed a third 
motion to assume the three franchise agreements. Chrysler 
and Krebs objected to all three motions. Charapp also 
expressed his reservations about the suggested sale 
because he had learned that Valley's Dodge franchise was 
soon to expire, and that Dodge was unwilling to extend the 
term. 
 
The bankruptcy court granted Valley's motions to reject 
the buy-sell agreement and to assume and sell the three 
sales and service franchises. During the hearing on Valley's 
motion to sell, however, the court allowed Charapp to 
withdraw his offer and then held an auction on the three 
franchises "as is, where is." Krebs won the bidding on all 
three and paid ten percent of the purchase price to Valley 
on the day of the hearing. The price for the Jeep-Eagle 
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franchise was $230,000. The bankruptcy court entered an 
order affirming the sale. Krebs has not paid the balance of 
the bid and has refused to close on the sale. 
 
Krebs instead moved for reconsideration of the orders 
granting Valley's three motions. Chrysler moved for 
reconsideration of the order to assume and the order to sell 
the franchises, but not the order to reject the buy-sell 
agreement. In response, Valley moved to compel Krebs to 
close on the ordered sale. The bankruptcy court denied 
Krebs's motions. It found that the buy-sell agreement was 
executory, that the business judgment test was applicable, 
and that Valley satisfied it. Accordingly, it upheld its order 
permitting Valley to reject the agreement under section 365. 
The bankruptcy court also found that Krebs did not have 
an equitable interest in the first $147,500 payment as 
either a set-off or recoupment against the amount due from 
the auction sale. The bankruptcy court ruled that, at most, 
Krebs had an unsecured claim because Valley's rejection 
operated as a prepetition breach of the buy-sell agreement. 
 
Chrysler's arguments largely paralleled Krebs's, except 
Chrysler also wanted the bankruptcy court to require Valley 
to comply with section 365(b)(1)(A)-(C) and (f)(2), which 
require debtors who have defaulted on executory contracts 
to cure the breaches or provide adequate assurance of 
future performance before assuming them. Valley opposed 
this motion, claiming that its breaches under the franchises 
were nonmonetary obligations excusing the statutory 
obligation to cure or assure performance. The bankruptcy 
court deferred its decision on Chrysler's motion because it 
did not have an adequate record and has yet to schedule an 
evidentiary hearing on Chrysler's motion. 
 
Finally, the bankruptcy court granted Valley's motion to 
compel Krebs to close on the ordered sale. It rejected 
Krebs's argument that the closings were conditioned on 
approval from the respective franchisors. The court held 
that the sale was not conditional; it was "as is, where is." 
 
Only Krebs appealed the bankruptcy court's order to the 
district court, although Chrysler filed a brief and argued in 
support of Krebs's position. The district court affirmed the 
bankruptcy court's decision and adopted its opinion. Now, 
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however, both Krebs and Chrysler have filed notices of 
appeal. 
 
The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction by virtue of 28 
U.S.C. S 157, and the district court had jurisdiction over 
Krebs's appeal under 28 U.S.C. S 158(a). We exercise 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 158(d) over final decisions of 
district courts entered under section 158(a). 
 
II. Chrysler's Appeal 
 
GMAC, a secured creditor, moved to dismiss Chrysler's 
appeal for lack of standing. GMAC argues that Chrysler is 
not a "person aggrieved" and therefore does not have 
standing to appeal the bankruptcy court's orders. To 
support its argument, GMAC points out that, 
notwithstanding the outcome on the merits, Krebs will be 
the owner of the Jeep-Eagle franchise; Chrysler will not be 
directly and pecuniarily affected. Chrysler argues that it is 
a person aggrieved and has standing despite its failure to 




Chrysler is in an unusual procedural position because it 
appeals from the district court's affirmance of a bankruptcy 
court order it never appealed from. A party may "appeal 
from a final judgment, order, or decree of a bankruptcy 
judge to a district court" as of right "by filing a notice of 
appeal with the [bankruptcy court] clerk within the time 
allowed by Rule 8002." Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8001. Moreover, 
the "[f]ailure of an appellant to take any step other than the 
timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity 
of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the 
district court . . . deems appropriate." Id. By implication, 
Chrysler's failure to file a notice of appeal to the district 
court from the bankruptcy court does affect the validity of 
its appeal to the Court of Appeals. See Shareholders v. 
Sound Radio, Inc., 109 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1997) ("The 
failure to file a timely notice of appeal [from the bankruptcy 
court] creates a jurisdictional defect barring appellate 
review."); In re Colon, 941 F.2d 242, 245-46 (3d Cir. 1991) 
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("a late filing is insufficient to vest the district court with 
jurisdiction of the appeal"). 
 
Rule 8002 gives persons aggrieved by a bankruptcy order 
ten days to file a notice of appeal. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 
8002(a). However, that rule also provides for an extension 
in certain circumstances: 
 
       "Effect of Motion on Time for Appeal. If any party makes 
       a timely motion of a type specified immediately below, 
       the time for appeal for all parties runs from the entry 
       of the order disposing of the last such motion 
       outstanding. This provision applies to a timely motion: 
       (1) to amend or make additional findings of fact under 
       Rule 7052, whether or not granting the motion would 
       alter the judgment; [or] (2) to alter or amend the 
       judgment under Rule 9023 . . . . A notice of appeal 
       filed after announcement or entry of the judgment, 
       order, or decree but before disposition of any of the 
       above motions is ineffective to appeal from the 
       judgment, order, or decree, or part thereof, specified in 
       the notice of appeal, until the entry of the order 
       disposing of the last such motion outstanding. 
       Appellate review of an order disposing of any of the 
       above motions requires the party, in compliance with 
       Rule 8001, to amend a previously filed notice of 
       appeal." 
 
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(b). Because the bankruptcy court 
hasn't ruled on Chrysler's motion to alter or amend, neither 
Krebs nor Chrysler can appeal the underlying orders at this 
time. Also, the bankruptcy court has not ruled on 
Chrysler's motion to reconsider, so Chrysler may not found 
its appeal here on that motion. Finally, while Krebs has 
appealed the denial of its motion to reconsider, Chrysler did 
not appeal that decision, either. Hence, the district court 
did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal from Chrysler. 
It follows that we lack jurisdiction over Chrysler's appeal 
from the district court order emanating from Krebs's 
appeal. 
 
In the cases cited by Chrysler and GMAC, the parties had 
first appealed a bankruptcy court order to the district 
court. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 45 F.3d 737, 
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740-41 (3d Cir. 1995) (order granting motion to vacate 
withdrawals and defaults of claims); In re Dykes, 10 F.3d 
184, 186 (3d Cir. 1993) (order confirming Chapter 13 plan); 
In re El San Juan Hotel, 809 F.2d 151, 152-53 (1st Cir. 
1987) (order granting U.S. leave to sue a former trustee); In 
re Fondiller, 707 F.2d 441, 441 (9th Cir. 1983) (order 
authorizing employment of special counsel for bankruptcy 
trustee). Chrysler cites only one case that even arguably 
supports its position regarding our jurisdiction over its 
appeal. In In re Colonial Broad. Corp., 758 F.2d 794 (1st 
Cir. 1985), the bankruptcy court issued an order accepting 
Joaquin Villamil's offer to buy the debtor's assets. The 
debtor, the committee of debtor's equity security holders, 
and Charles Woods (a potential buyer who submitted a 
higher, but belated bid) all filed motions for 
reconsideration. After the bankruptcy court denied these 
motions, all three appealed the underlying order accepting 
the Villamil bid to the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Puerto Rico. The district court dismissed the debtor's 
appeal for failure to prosecute. Although the equity security 
holders and Woods filed separate appeals, the equity 
security holders "appeared in Woods' appeal by both filing 
a statement of intent to join and fully support Woods' 
position and then filing their own brief." Id. at 798. The 
district court dismissed the remaining two appeals because 
it held that the bankruptcy court's order accepting the 
Villamil bid was interlocutory, and not appealable. 
Considering the notices of appeal as motions for leave to 
appeal an interlocutory order, the district court denied 
leave to appeal because a subsequent bankruptcy court 
order confirming the sale on different terms mooted the 
order accepting the bid. All three previous appellants 
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 
including the debtor whose appeal had been dismissed. 
 
The Court of Appeals first addressed the debtor's 
untimely appeal from the district court's dismissal: 
 
       "We begin by noting that we have no jurisdiction over 
       the appeal of the debtor, ACBC. ACBC's appeal . . . was 
       dismissed by the district court for failure to prosecute. 
       No notice of appeal was filed within the thirty-day 
       period allowed for appeals. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). The 
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       requirements of Rule 4(a) are "mandatory and 
       jurisdictional," and ACBC's failure to comply with these 
       requirements leave this court without jurisdiction." 
 
Id. at 799 (citation omitted). The Court continued, "Nor can 
we consider ACBC a proper party to appeal the district 
court's denial of the Woods appeal since, unlike the Equity 
Security Holders, ACBC did not either file an appearance or 
join in that action." Id. Chrysler now cites this statement 
for the proposition that it can appeal to this Court without 
first appealing from the bankruptcy court because it 
submitted a brief to the district court. 
 
We reject this argument. First, the sentence in Colonial 
Broadcasting upon which Chrysler relies is dicta, in light of 
the Court's previous determination that the debtor's appeal 
should be dismissed as untimely. Here, although Chrysler 
has timely appealed from the district court's decision, it 
failed to appeal from the bankruptcy court. Second, to allow 
a party like Chrysler to appear before a court of appeals 
without first appealing to the district court, even if that 
party somehow participated in the district court 
proceedings, would nullify bankruptcy rules 8001 and 
8002. Following Chrysler's logic, if a party at the 
bankruptcy court level could convince an appellant at the 
district court level to name it as an appellee, it would be 
able to bypass district court review--hardly a desirable or 
contemplated result. This, however, does not mean that a 
non-party can never appeal a bankruptcy court order. The 
"person aggrieved" rule covers that situation. If an 
aggrieved party files a timely appeal from both the 
bankruptcy court and the district court, the court of 
appeals will have jurisdiction over its claim. 
 
B. Standing as a Person Aggrieved 
 
The "person aggrieved" rule states that only those whose 
pecuniary interests are directly and adversely affected by a 
bankruptcy court order that "diminishes their property, 
increases their burdens, or impairs their rights," may 
appeal. Travelers, 45 F.3d at 741-42 (quoting Dykes, 10 
F.3d at 187). "[W]hether someone is a `person aggrieved' is 
normally a question of fact to be determined by the district 
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court." Travelers, 45 F.3d at 742; see also Dykes, 10 F.3d 
at 188. Because the facts were undisputed in Travelers and 
Dykes, we could reach the standing issues. Here, however, 
the parties dispute whether Valley's obligations to Chrysler 
are recoverable under the cure provisions of section 365(b) 
or are excusable nonmonetary obligations. This precise 
dispute prompted the bankruptcy court to delay ruling on 
Chrysler's motion to reconsider, and it has not ruled or 
even scheduled an evidentiary hearing on that motion. 
Hence, for now there is simply no record support for 
Chrysler's argument that it is a person aggrieved. 
 
Moreover, we doubt that Chrysler is a "person aggrieved," 
even under its version of the facts. In its response to 
GMAC's motion to dismiss its appeal, Chrysler alleged that 
it suffered damages because Valley had breached its 
franchises (although it was going to waive its remedies if 
Krebs acquired the franchises through the buy-sell 
agreement). Admittedly then, Chrysler's only pecuniary 
interest is whether it will receive a cure for those defaults 
under section 365. Although the bankruptcy court has yet 
to rule on that issue, Chrysler has not shown how its 
interest will be affected whether the franchises are 
transferred to Krebs under the buy-sell agreement or via 
the auction sale. Even if the franchises were assigned 
pursuant to the buy-sell agreement, no one disputes that 
the underlying franchises were executory contracts, and 
there is nothing to relieve Valley from assuming them 
before it could perform under the buy-sell agreement. 
Furthermore, the bankruptcy court has yet to decide 
whether Chrysler is entitled to cure or assurances under 
section 365 because it has not ruled on Chrysler's motion 
to reconsider or amend. Hence, Chrysler is simply not a 





We acknowledge that we have occasionally allowed non- 
parties to appeal district court decisions in nonbankruptcy 
contexts, but those cases are either inapposite or 
distinguishable. In Delaware Valley Citizens Council for 
Clean Air v. Davis, 932 F.2d 256 (3d Cir. 1991), citizens 
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groups appealed the dismissal of one of the four counts in 
their complaint. We allowed the EPA to join them, stating 
"we believe that the EPA has a sufficient stake in the 
outcome of this case to join the Citizens' appeal as a party- 
appellant because Pennsylvania could use the judgment to 
collaterally estop the EPA in [a related] administrative 
appeal." Id. at 263 n.6. Here, Chrysler does not argue that 
our decision in this case will have any preclusive effect 
upon it in any other proceeding. 
 
In Caplan v. Fellheimer Eichen Braverman & Kaskey, 68 
F.3d 828 (3d Cir. 1995), involving a sexual harassment suit 
by a female attorney against her former law firm, we 
allowed the firm's insurance carrier, Vigilant, standing. In 
doing so, we established the following rule: 
 
       "Generally, it is true that those who were not parties 
       before the district court may not appeal an order of the 
       district court. We have, however, recognized that a 
       non-party may bring an appeal in a situation where 
       three conditions are met: 1) the equities favor the 
       appeal; 2) the non-party has participated in some way 
       in the proceedings before the district court; and 3) the 
       non-party has a stake in the outcome of the district 
       court proceedings, which is discernable from the 
       record." 
 
Id. at 836. 
 
Here, Chrysler participated in the district court by filing 
a brief and arguing in support of Krebs's position, albeit 
over GMAC's objection. Thus, the second requirement is 
satisfied. Regarding the first, we see no equities favoring 
Chrysler. Certainly, Chrysler has an interest in who owns 
their franchises. This interest is embodied in the"veto" 
power it has over a proposed transfer of the Jeep-Eagle 
franchise. However, the transfer under the buy-sell 
agreement and the auction sale ordered by the bankruptcy 
court were both to Krebs--a Chrysler approved assignee. 
Therefore, the interest in approving subsequent owners of 
Chrysler-product franchises has been satisfied. Chrysler's 
equity argument fails. The third element is similar to the 
person aggrieved test, analyzed above. 
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Thus, even under these nonbankruptcy cases, Chrysler 
cannot appeal. In sum, not only has Chrysler attempted to 
circumvent proper procedure, but the bankruptcy court's 
order has had no direct bearing on its pecuniary interests. 
The order has not diminished its property, increased its 
burdens or impaired its rights. Those alleged effects have 
already occurred by virtue of Valley's past breaches of the 
sales and service franchises, and the bankruptcy court has 
yet to decide whether it will order Valley to cure those 





GMAC argues that Krebs's appeal is moot under 11 
U.S.C. S 363(m) because Krebs is attacking the validity of 
the Jeep-Eagle franchise sale without first procuring a stay. 




Before we begin our analysis of section 363(m) and its 
application here, we must examine whether section 363(m) 
applies to the sale of the franchises. Krebs argues that the 
franchises were assumed and assigned under section 365, 
which exclusively governs the rejection, assumption, and 
assignment of executory contracts. We disagree. 
 
Section 363(b) provides that "[t]he trustee, after notice 
and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the 
ordinary course of business, property of the estate." 
(emphasis added.) Section 365(f)(1) provides that "the 
trustee may assign . . . [executory] contract[s] or 
[unexpired] lease[s] under paragraph (2) of this subsection." 
Section 363 includes a statutory mootness provision, while 
section 365 does not. The issue is whether section 365 is 
the exclusive provision governing the sale of the franchises 
or whether the mootness provision in section 363 also 
covers this situation. In other words, our inquiry is whether 
assignments of the franchises under section 365 are also 
sales of estate property subject to section 363(m). We 
conclude that they are. 
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In describing the scope of the bankruptcy estate, section 
541 casts a wide net: 
 
       (a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 
       302, or 303 of this title creates an estate. Such estate 
       is comprised of all the following property, wherever 
       located and by whomever held: 
 
       (1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of 
       this section, all legal or equitable interests of the 
       debtor in property as of the commencement of the 
       case. 
 
11 U.S.C. S 541(a)(1) (emphasis added). To determine if the 
franchises are property under section 541, we look to state 
law. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54, 99 S. Ct. 
914, 917 (1979) ("Congress has generally left the 
determination of property rights in the assets of a 
bankrupt's estate to state law."); accord In re Modular 
Structures, Inc., 27 F.3d 72, 77 (3d Cir. 1994) (collecting 
cases). Here, the franchises allowed Valley to sell vehicles in 
Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles Act, Pa. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 63, S 818.1 et seq. defines a franchise as: 
 
       "The written agreement between any new vehicle 
       manufacturer or distributor and any new vehicle dealer 
       or between any new vehicle manufacturer and 
       distributor which purports to fix the legal rights and 
       liabilities of the parties to such agreement, and 
       pursuant to which the dealer or distributor purchases 
       and resells the franchise product or leases or rents the 
       dealership or distributorship premises." 
 
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, S 818.2. Before the enactment of this 
definition, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had opined 
that: 
 
       "[i]n its simplest terms, a franchise is a license from 
       the owner of a trademark or trade name permitting 
       another to sell a product or service under the name or 
       mark. More broadly stated, the franchise has evolved 
       into an elaborate agreement by which the franchisee 
       undertakes to conduct a business or sell a product or 
       service in accordance with methods and procedures 
       prescribed by the franchisor, and the franchisor 
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       undertakes to assist the franchisee through 
       advertising, promotion and other advisory services." 
 
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Razumic, 390 A.2d 736, 740 (Pa. 
1978) (quoting Piercing Pagoda, Inc. v. Hoffner, 351 A.2d 
207, 211 (Pa. 1976)). Furthermore, the "cornerstone of a 
franchise system must be the trademark or trade name of 
a product. It is this uniformity of product and control of its 
quality and distribution which causes the public to turn to 
franchise stores for the product." Atlantic Richfield, 390 
A.2d at 740 (quoting Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 
636, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 
1964)). Under Pennsylvania law, "[t]he ownership of a 
trade-mark has, in general, been considered as a right of 
property." Appeal of Laughman, 18 A. 415, 416 ( Pa. 1889). 
 
Trademarks are property, and franchises are licenses to 
use such property. Thus, under Pennsylvania law, these 
franchises are interests in property, and as such are 
property of the estate under section 541. Cf.5 Collier on 
Bankruptcy P 541.06[5] (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th 
ed. rev. 1997) ("The debtor's estate includes any interest 
under an executory contract to purchase goods either from 
or by the debtor."). They are also covered by section 363, 
although the procedure for their transfer is delineated by 
section 365. Therefore, section 363(m) governs the sale of 
the franchises here, notwithstanding that section 365 
applies to the particular mechanics of conveyance. 
 
A case cited by Krebs for the opposite result actually 
supports our conclusion. Recognizing the operation of both 
section 363 and 365 in the transfer of executory contracts, 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that before 
a sale of an executory contract may be concluded under 
section 363, it must be assumed under section 365. See In 
re Qintex Entertainment, Inc., 950 F.2d 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 
1991). This was necessary because under Ninth Circuit 
precedent, unassumed executory contracts are not part of 
the bankruptcy estate. Id. Thus, Qintex supports our 
conclusion that section 363 governs the "sales" of contracts 
here. Section 365 provides some limitations and conditions 
to assignments; none of which negates the applicability of 
section 363 to the sale, at auction, of the franchises. 
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Nor is our decision in In re Joshua Slocum Ltd., 922 F.2d 
1081 (3d Cir. 1990), to the contrary. In Slocum, the debtor, 
a lessee of retail space in a shopping center, requested and 
received authorization from the bankruptcy court to 
assume and assign its lease to a third party. The 
bankruptcy court approved the assignment but amended 
the assigned lease to delete an average sales requirement 
clause. The district court affirmed without opinion, and 
thus denied the lessor's motion to dismiss for mootness. On 
appeal, the appellee again moved to dismiss the appeal as 
moot, citing section 363(m). 
 
Although we found that the appeal was not moot, Slocum 
does not control our decision here. There, the Trustee 
requested and received "authorization to assume and 
assign the Lease pursuant to 11 U.S.C. S 365." Id. at 1084. 
However, the Trustee never attempted to sell the the Lease 
under section 363, and the parties conceded that section 
363(m) did not apply in cases where the Trustee merely 
assigns a lease under section 365. Id. at 1085. Unlike 
Slocum, the bankruptcy judge in this case authorized both 
an assumption under section 365 and a subsequent sale 
under section 363. The bankruptcy court also conducted 
an auction for purposes of selling the franchises under the 
rules implementing section 363, which state that "all sales 
not in the ordinary course of business may be by private 
sale or by public auction." Fed. R. Bankr. P. 6004(f)(1). 
There is no parallel provision under section 365 or its 
companion, Fed. R. Bankr. P. 6006. For all these reasons, 
Slocum does not foreclose our conclusion that the sale of 




Section 363 allows the sale or lease of property of the 
estate, not in the ordinary course of business, but imposes 
a limit on appellate review: 
 
       "The reversal or modification on appeal of an 
       authorization under subsection (b) or (c) of this section 
       of a sale or lease of property does not affect the validity 
       of a sale or lease under such authorization to an entity 
       that purchased or leased such property in good faith, 
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       whether or not such entity knew of the pendency of the 
       appeal, unless such authorization and such sale or 
       lease were stayed pending appeal." 
 
11 U.S.C. S 363(m). We earlier identified two possible 
constructions of this subsection, without adopting either. 
See Pittsburgh Food & Beverage, Inc. v. Ranallo, 112 F.3d 
645, 648-49 (3d Cir. 1997). One construction, followed by 
a majority of courts of appeals, is a per se rule, mooting 
appeals absent a stay of the sale or lease at issue. See id. 
at 649-51 (citing cases of the 1st, 2d, 5th, 7th, 11th, and 
D.C. Circuits); see also In re Onouli-Kona Land Co., 846 
F.2d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1988) (following per se rule with 
one exception: appeals not moot where property is sold to 
a creditor who is a party to the appeal and the sale is 
subject to a statutory right of redemption). 
 
A second formulation comes from how we construed a 
parallel provision in the Code, section 364(e), which governs 
the validity of debts or liens granted to a good faith 
creditor: 
 
       "The reversal or modification on appeal of an 
       authorization under this section to obtain credit or 
       incur debt, or of a grant under this section of a priority 
       or a lien, does not affect the validity of any debt so 
       incurred, or any priority or lien so granted, to an entity 
       that extended such credit in good faith, whether or not 
       such entity knew of the pendency of the appeal, unless 
       such authorization and the incurring of such debt, or 
       the granting of such priority or lien, were stayed 
       pending appeal." 
 
11 U.S.C. S 364(e). See In re Swedeland Dev. Group, Inc., 16 
F.3d 552 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc) (discussed in Pittsburgh 
Food, 112 F.3d at 648). 
 
In construing section 364(e), we refused to adopt a per se 
rule: 
 
       "[T]here is no escape from the logic that inasmuch as 
       section 364(e) provides for the consequences of the 
       reversal or modification of an order under 364(d) when 
       the order has not been stayed pending appeal, it is 
       impossible to conclude that section 364(e) in itself 
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       requires that an appeal be dismissed if a stay is not 
       obtained. After all, neither Swedeland nor anyone else 
       can explain how there can be a "reversal or 
       modification" of an order, if the appeal from the order 
       has been dismissed. 
 
       Yet this exercise in logic is not dispositive of the 
       mootness issue for even though section 364(e) standing 
       alone does not require dismissal of an appeal when a 
       stay is not granted, it might establish circumstances 
       which under law other than section 364(e) require 
       dismissal of the appeal. Thus in our consideration of 
       the mootness argument we cannot limit our inquiry to 
       an examination of section 364(e)." 
 
Id. at 559 (emphasis added). In Swedeland, we held that an 
appeal from a section 364(d) order regarding a loan in 
which a portion of the funds had not been disbursed was 
not moot under general mootness principles because it was 
possible to fashion some meaningful, if only partial, relief. 
Id. at 560-61. Regarding a fully disbursed loan, however, 
the appeal was moot because the district court could not 
fashion any effective relief that would not violate section 
364(e). Id. at 562-63. 
 
We reject the per se rule. Viewing section 363(m) through 
the prism of Swedeland's construction of section 364(e), 
section 363(m) would not moot every appeal not 
accompanied by a stay. It does, however, restrict the results 
of a reversal or modification of a bankruptcy court's order 
authorizing a sale or lease, if reversal or modification would 
affect the validity of the sale or lease. That is precisely the 
situation here. Accordingly, there are two prerequisites for 
section 363(m) "statutory" mootness: (1) the underlying sale 
or lease was not stayed pending the appeal, and (2) the 
court, if reversing or modifying the authorization to sell or 




Since the first prerequisite is present, we must see 
whether a remedy can be fashioned that will not affect the 
validity of the sale. In doing so, we must look to the 
remedies requested by the appellants. See Pittsburgh Food 
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& Beverage, 112 F.3d at 649-50. Krebs argues that the 
rejection of the buy-sell agreement was improper because 
that contract was not executory, and alternatively, if it was, 
it did not satisfy the business judgment test. Krebs wants 
us to reverse the bankruptcy court's order allowing Valley 
to reject the buy-sell agreement. Naturally, this would have 
an impact on the validity of the auction sale of the Jeep- 
Eagle franchise, because reversing the rejection would 
necessarily require reversing the subsequent assumption 
and assignment of the underlying franchises. Clearly, this 
remedy is not permitted by section 363(m). 
 
Krebs also argues that at the very least, it should get 
some form of recoupment, credit or refund for the amount 
it paid under the first installment of the buy-sell 
agreement. Under Pittsburgh Food, however, a refund would 
be an attack on the sale price, impermissibly affecting the 
validity of the sale. See Pittsburgh Food, 112 F.2d at 649, 
650; see also In re The Charter Co., 829 F.2d 1054, 1056 
(11th Cir. 1987) ("[A] refund of a portion of the purchase 
price. . . . a central element of a purchase . . . challeng[es] 
the validity of the sale itself."). 
 
Krebs argues that the relief it requests will not affect any 
third parties, and were we to order a refund, it would only 
come from GMAC, a creditor, not from innocent third 
parties who may have already spent the proceeds. Section 
363(m), however, contains no exception for sales to 
creditors, or other parties to the bankruptcy proceedings, or 
to deep-pocketed financing companies like GMAC. 
Moreover, as we and other courts have recognized, section 
363(m) was created to promote the policy of thefinality of 
bankruptcy court orders, and to prevent harmful effects on 
the bidding process resulting from the bidders' knowledge 
that the highest bid may not end up being the final sale 
price. Pittsburgh Food, 112 F.3d at 647-48. 
 
We also reject Krebs's request for recoupment. Under 
that doctrine, a debtor's demand must arise from the same, 
integrated transaction as the claim against it. See In re 
Flagstaff Realty Assocs., 60 F.3d 1031, 1035 (3d Cir. 1995). 
Here, Valley's demand for the auction price derives from the 
auction sale, while Krebs's claim arises from the buy-sell 
agreement. The auction sale and the buy-sell agreement are 
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not a single integrated transaction. Rather, they are 
separate transactions that merely seek to accomplish the 
same result: the transfer of the franchises to Krebs. 
 
Everything Krebs seeks affects the validity of the sale. 
Thus, under section 363(m), Krebs's appeal is moot 
because it did not receive a stay of the sale pending appeal, 
the sale has since been closed, and the relief it seeks would 




We hereby dismiss Chrysler's appeal from the district 
court because it did not properly appeal from the 
bankruptcy court and does not have standing as a person 
aggrieved by the bankruptcy court's decision. We also 
dismiss Krebs's appeal as moot for failure to stay the 
franchise sale. This cause is remanded to the district court 
so that it may dismiss Krebs's appeal from the bankruptcy 
court's order. 
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